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Abstract
We employ a difference-in-difference regression model to analyse the efficiency of
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We provide evidence for 26 of the most developed countries in the world in the period
1980-2014. Following the work of Dynarski [2004], Cameron et al. [2008, 2012] and
Hoechle [2007], we compare the results under three methods of regression analysis.
We confirm that carbon taxation has preformed well in the 35 years under observation
in that they efficiently control CO2 emissions. We find that the longer duration a
country uses carbon taxation, the greater the reduction in CO2 emissions. For the
countries that use both an ETS and carbon taxation, we find an even more efficient
CO2 emission reduction. The results are robust to heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation
and cross-sectional dependence.
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1 Introduction
Carbon taxation and Emissions Trading Systems (ETS) are generally considered to be
efficient environmental policies to reduce CO2 emissions. However, in 2017, only 42 national
and 25 subnational jurisdictions had some form of carbon pricing — either through an
emissions trading scheme or a carbon tax. Instead, more countries have been using nuclear
or renewable energies such as wind, solar, geothermal and biomass in the past decades
to reduce CO2 emissions. Finland and Sweden are two of the very few countries that
have both implemented a carbon tax and an ETS scheme (as both are in the EU-ETS
Scheme). Moreover both countries also use nuclear and non-renewable energy sources. Data
from these two countries demonstrate a clear and dramatic reduction in CO2 emissions.
However, it is difficult to conclude whether the emission reduction results from carbon
pricing instruments, the lower consumption of energy, intensity improvement or GDP
reduction. In this article, we focus on carbon pricing instruments. We test the treatment
effects of carbon taxation policy and a joint use of both taxation and ETS. We then
determine whether they efficiently control CO2 emissions and which one has performed
better. Our aim is to provide empirical evidence to encourage and support the implementation
of carbon pricing instruments.
Many researchers have provided evidence of the effectiveness of carbon pricing instruments,
both theoretically and empirically. For example, Newell et al. [2013] provide a clear
summary of the carbon market performance in several countries. The existing empirical
literature usually chooses a short time horizon. In this article, we try to include most
developed countries (that satisfy our countries selection criteria for the difference-in-difference
model) as possible and at the same time use a long time horizon to support our analysis.
We employ a difference-in-difference regression model to analyse the efficiency of carbon
taxation policy and its interaction with an ETS, as evidence for the most developed
countries in the world over the period 1980-2014. As of December 2014, 17 countries
had introduced carbon taxation as part of their emission reduction strategies. We include
11 of them – 64.1% in our analysis. The six carbon taxation users that are excluded are
Latvia, Estonia, Slovenia, Iceland, Poland and Mexico. We drop the first four countries due
to insufficient data.1 We drop Poland and Mexico because of their lower levels of economic
development. It finally leaves us with a 35-year panel data series across 26 countries. We
include the shares of consumption of the different forms of energy usage as well as commonly
used measures such as Gross Domestic Product based on Purchasing Power Parity per
capita (GDP on PPP) , energy intensity (EI) as control covariates following Zakarya et al.
[2015], Bruvoll and Larsen [2004], Lin and Li [2011], Scrimgeour et al. [2005], Song et al.
[2015], Meng et al. [2013], Doda et al. [2012] and Liu et al. [2015], just list a few. To
1Hoechle’s (2007) approach can handle missing values problem. However, the authors prefer the
balanced data.
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deal with few clusters, we use a country specific bootstrap following the work of Cameron
et al. [2008, 2012] and make adequate use of bootstrap replicates.2. We find evidence of
cross-sectionally strong mixing, although every country’s environmental policy setting and
energy consumption is, in principle, independent. We explain the correlation between the
countries as the neighbourhood effects. (see Tanguay et al. [2004])3 We correct for the
cross-sectional dependence following Hoechle [2007]. To test the sensitivity of the choice
of treatment and control groups, we follow Dynarski [2004]’s approach. We then compare
the results under three classic methods. We find the treatment effects of carbon pricing
instruments are statistically significant. The coefficients of interest in the regressions
exhibit the 95% confidence intervals away from zero with small p-values. Although the
results differ depending on the choice of covariates, we suggest that carbon taxation has
preformed well in the past 35 years. They efficiently control CO2 emissions. We also
find the evidence that the longer duration a country uses carbon taxation, the greater the
reduction in CO2 emissions. We provide evidence to confirm the significant effectiveness
of carbon pricing instruments for both a carbon tax and an ETS. For the countries that
use both instruments, we find an even more efficient CO2 emission reduction process.
With the signing of the Paris Agreement on CO2 reductions by most countries in
December 2015, the results of this study will have considerable implications for policymakers
in the years ahead as they find ways to implement the commitments made to emission
reductions. Indeed, the findings of this research have clear implications for countries that
made commitments to cut their CO2 emissions; that is the use of market-based instruments
such as an ETS and especially carbon taxation are effective mitigation methods.
The rest of the article is organised as follows. In Section, 2 we discuss the setting and
underlying assumptions of the model. The Data description is provided in Section 3. We
report the regression outputs in Section 4 and provide the robustness check in Section 5.
Section 6 concludes the article.
2 Model
We test the efficiency of CO2 reduction through the use of carbon pricing instruments —
carbon taxation in particular and its interaction with an ETS. Let N be the total number
of countries in our data, N1 be the number of treatment groups that have implemented the
environmental policy during the years 1980-2014 and N0 be the number of control groups
that have not changed the environmental policy. We employ a linear panel data model
23000 bootstrap replicates are performed in our main results. In robustness check, we report the results
by using 500, 1000 and 2000 replicates.
3Martén (2014) suggests that there would be benefits to neighbouring countries to harmonise
their energy policies. See the Wall Street Journal https://blogs.wsj.com/experts/2014/10/02/
neighboring-countries-should-harmonize-energy-policies/
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with time and entity fixed effects. This is expressed as follows:
CO2it = αdit + x
′
itβ + θi + δt + εit (1)
where CO2it represents carbon dioxide emissions per capita per year from fossil fuel use
and cement production excluding short-cycle biomass burning (for example, agricultural
waste burning) and excluding large-scale biomass burning (for example, forest fires). CO2it
is the dependent variable, where i represents country and t represents year; dit is the
environmental policy dummy variable whose coefficient α is the object of interest in this
study. dit equals one if the environment policy of interest is in effect and zero otherwise;
x′it represents a vector of independent variables with parameter vector β including gross
domestic product at purchasing power parity per capita per year, energy intensity4 and the
shares of energy consumption of renewables and non-renewables to the primary energy; θi
and δt are country specific and time specific effects respectively; εit is the error term under
different assumptions.
Assumption 1. The standard error is assumed to be heteroskedastic and autocorrelated.
The panel data are assumed to be cross sectionally (spatically) uncorrelated. There is no
temporal variation in the environmental policy dummy variable d˜it.
It is an assumption widely used for the case when time T is fixed and the numbers of
both the treatment and control group are large. However, the number of countries that
implement carbon pricing instruments is small. To deal with the few clusters issue, we
follow Cameron et al. [2008, 2012] and Cameron and Miller [2010] and use a sufficient
number of bootstrap replicates.
We now take account of general forms of cross-sectional dependence and analyse complex
patterns of mutual dependence in the panels.
Assumption 2. The standard error is assumed to be groupwise heteroskedastic, autocorrelated
up to some lag length,5 and cross-sectional (spatial) and temporal dependent of general
forms, i.e., Driscoll and Kraay (1997) standard error.
We can thus rewrite the model as follows:
C˜O2it = αd˜it + x˜
′
itβ + ε˜it (2)
where the country-year random effects are not average away. By regressing C˜O2it on d˜it
and x˜′it, we can obtain an estimation of α.
We suggest the existence of the neighbourhood effects for policy implementation and
4Energy intensity (EI) is calculated as the amount of energy a country needs to generate a unit of
gross domestic product (GDP), while energy consumption per capita represents total primary energy
consumption divided by the population of the country.
5The selection of the lag length of floor[4(T/100)2/9] follows Newey and West (1994).
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energy use: countries that are geographically located close by or in the same region seem to
have similar environmental policies. Not unexpectedly, a country’s policy potentially has an
impact on its neighbouring countries. Some groups of countries that are part of trade blocs
(for example, EU countries) lend themselves considerably to the neighbourhood effects of
government policies, including carbon pricing and sometimes even the selection of nuclear
and renewable energy. It stands to reason that neighbouring countries that trade with
each other to a greater degree are more likely to harmonise their environmental policies.
Besides the EU-ETS which is applied to all EU countries, similar ties apply to APEC
and OECD members. Some environmental regulations are applied to all the members.
Another cause of such effects is the geographic nature: neighbouring countries might share
the similar natural resources and therefore the consumption of energy. The claim of the
neighbourhood effects is supported by our data in Table (1). We find the implementation
of carbon pricing instruments and the consumption of renewables and non-renewables are
more alike regionally. An obvious example are the four Nordic countries. Furthermore,
for close neighbouring countries, we often find great similarity pairwise. Examples are
Australia and New Zealand, USA and Canada, all of which have similar environmental
policies. We therefore correct for cross-sectional dependence because of the neighbourhood
effects in environmental policy as well as in energy use.
3 Data description
The variable we are interested is the country specific yearly CO2 emission reduction
through the use of carbon pricing instruments. We use the shares of consumption of
renewable and non-renewable energy sources as the control covariates6 as well as commonly
used measures such as GDP on PPP and energy intensity. The time series data of
CO2 emission totals cross countries is obtained from the Emission Database for Global
Atmospheric Research (EDGAR), European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC).7
The country-specific CO2 emission totals exclude short-cycle biomass burning (such as
agricultural waste burning) and large-scale biomass burning (such as forest fires). The data
of national and subnational carbon pricing instruments is compiled from OECD Economic
Surveys,8 International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP) and World Bank Group.9 The
6We include energy consumption share to the primary energy instead of energy consumption because of
‘bad control’ problem. For example, one can argue that carbon tax reduces the consumption of coal, while
the reduction of coal consumption also reduces CO2 emission. We test the effect of carbon taxation on the
energy consumption by regressing CO2 emission on the yearly consumption of each energy source as well
as its share on the primary energy. We find that the direct effect of carbon tax on energy consumption
share is much less. The regression outputs are given in the appendix.
7See: Trends in global CO2 emissions: 2015 Report by PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment
Agency and the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre.
8See: OECD Economic Surveys: Poland 2012, Issue 7, Volume 2012.
9See: State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2014 and 2015 by World Bank Group.
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annual energy consumption data is from BP Statistical Review of World Energy.10 The
data of annual GDP on PPP and population is extracted from the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), OECD11 and World Bank Group databases. To satisfy the common trend
assumption in our difference-in-difference model, we keep only the most developed countries
following the IMF’s criteria for advanced economies12, World Bank high-income economies13
and High-income OECD members14.
The original dataset includes 207 countries. As of December 2014 the number of
countries that implemented either carbon taxation or an ETS was 17 and 37 respectively.
Eleven countries used both carbon pricing instruments. They are Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Republic of Ireland, Japan, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland and
United Kingdom. The carbon pricing instrument users are mostly developed countries. To
use a difference-in-difference (DID) model to analyse the effect of carbon pricing policies
on CO2 emission, we need to choose the closest matched countries. For this reason, we
check each country’s yearly CO2 emission, GDP preformance and energy intensity growth
and drop the developing and the least developed countries.
We then test the consumption of non-renewable energies (including coal, hydroelectricity,
natural gas, nuclear and oil) and renewable energies (including solar, wind, geothermal,
biomass and other) in each individual country. We drop the consumption of oil due to
multicollinearity. It finally leaves us a panel data across 26 representative countries over
the time period 1980-2014. In terms of carbon taxation, the number of the treatment group
is 11 representing 17 countries who are the real carbon taxation users as of December 2014.
Ten out of these eleven countries have implemented both a carbon taxation and an ETS.
A brief summary of the 35-year panel data across 26 countries in 4 regions (grouped
by geographic location) is shown in Table (1): Asia Pacific (7), Europe (16), Middle
East (1) and North America (2). It summaries the starting date of the policies that
were implemented and their length. Note that an interruption in the continuous use
of some energy exists. That is, during the 35-year period, some countries may have
stopped using some types of energy and switched to others, for example, for the sake
of seeking a more efficient solution of CO2 reduction. Such interruption does not apply to
the continuous implementation of carbon pricing instruments. Table (1) includes carbon
pricing instruments, renewable energies and nuclear energy consumption in use from 1980
to 2014 which are all widely considered as ‘environmental friendly’ approaches to reduce
CO2 efficiently.
10See: Statistical Review of World Energy 2015 and 2016 by BP.
11See: World Economic and Financial Surveys by IMF and Economic Surveys by OECD.
12See: IMF Advanced Economies List. World Economic Outlook, April 2016, p. 148
13See: Country and Lending Groups by World Bank Group. Accessed on August 1, 2016
14See: Members and partners by OECD. Retrieved 1 August 2016
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As briefly mentioned earlier, we find that countries that are located closely are more
likely to design similar environmental policies (and energy use). By the same token, the
environmental policies (and energy use) in countries further apart are less alike.
3.1 Subnational jurisdiction
Many subnational jurisdictions have implemented carbon pricing policies such as Québec,
California and Tokyo. For our analysis, we use country level data. If subnational carbon
pricing instruments (ETS and/or carbon tax) are implemented, for simplicity of model,
we consider the instruments to be national. For example, due to the implementation of
Alberta SGER (2007 - now), British Columbia carbon tax (2008 - now) and Québec CaT
(2013 - now), we consider Canada, as an entity in our model, a country using both carbon
taxes and Emissions Trading System. This rule applies to three countries as shown in
Table (2): Canada, USA and Japan. The only excluded country is China which started to
use a city-level Pilot ETS since 2013.
Table 2: Subnational carbon pricing instruments in operation
Country Carbon Pricing Instruments
ETS Carbon Tax
Canada Alberta SGER (2007 - now) British Columbia carbon tax (2008 - now)
Québec CaT (2013 - now)
USA RGGI (2009 - now)
California CaT (2012 - now)
Japan Tokyo CaT (2010 - now) National (2012 - now)
Saitama ETS (2011 - now)
Kyoto ETS (2011 - now)
Source: World Bank Group, State and Trends of Carbon Pricing, 2015
3.2 Trend of CO2 and GDP preformance
From the Stata graphs, countries show a very similar trend of yearly CO2 emission per
capita. Moreover, the common trend of neighbouring countries such as Australia and New
Zealand; EU countries including UK (almost all of them are X sharped), Hong Kong and
Singapore; Canada and USA; Japan, Taiwan, Korea are clearer. The exemption of our
pairwise/region comparison is Greece — because of the severe economic recession it is
facing in the recent years. As CO2 emissions are closely correlated with GDP growth,
some can argue that Greece’s CO2 reduction is from its sharp GDP reduction rather than
environmental policies. However, before its recession, the common trend of CO2 emission
can still be found.
8
We first look at the GDP performance and CO2 emission trend of non-EU countries
1980-2014 from Figure (1).
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10
Ten non-EU countries are all APEC countries except Israel. Australia started to use a
carbon tax since 2012 but ended the policy just 3 years later in 2015.15 New Zealand started
to use an ETS from 2008. We can see a clear trend that after the policy implementation
in both countries, CO2 emissions showed a gradual reduction. This is due, in no small
measure, to the carbon pricing instruments used. Canada is one of the countries that
use both carbon pricing instruments — starting tax from 2007 and ETS from 2008. The
USA (California) started using an ETS from 2009. Both Canada and the USA have only
implemented carbon pricing subnationally. In both countries, CO2 emissions were reduced
marginally. The countries with the least impressive records were Korea and Taiwan.
Both countries are non-carbon pricing instruments users. Interestingly, Korea started to
use nuclear power since 1980 and renewables since 1991. Taiwan has been a renewable
energy user since 1982. While Taiwan shows a slight reduction, Korea shows absolutely
no reduction. Of course, taking account of GDP preformance, these two countries at least
have some control on CO2 emissions.
15Our analysis on the tax effect on Australia’s CO2 reduction was only based on the data from 1980-2014.
We have not estimated the effect of the repeal of the carbon tax on Australia’s CO2 reductions.
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We discuss EU countries separately for a good reason. The EU countries are very similar
in many ways; under EU regulation, they have to adapt an ETS. The countries nearby
are more alike in terms of renewable energy consumption and advanced ‘environmentally
friendly’ technology development. They also react similarly to the economic shocks. All
the 15 EU countries (including UK) in our data have implemented ETS since 2005 without
interruption. Switzerland started later in 2008. Besides the four Nordic countries, Ireland
(since 2010) and Switzerland (since 2008) have introduced carbon taxation for a considerably
long period of time. Carbon Taxation has been implemented in the UK and France for a
short period, since 2013 and 2014, respectively. All the EU countries exhibited similar
shaped graphs, except Greece since 2008, probably resulting from its GDP recession.
Considering each countries’ GDP growth, all of them have efficiently controlled CO2
emissions with the use of a carbon pricing mechanism and/or the consumption of renewables
and nuclear power.
Figure (3) reports the CO2 emission reduction and GDP preference of four Nordic
countries — Sweden, Norway, Finland and Denmark. The four Nordic countries are the
first carbon taxation-users, all start from the early nineteen-nineties, and then implement
the EU-ETS in the year 2005 which makes them the first ones to use an ETS in the world
as well. Following the Paris Agreement, they made commitments to implement deeper
than usual emission cuts.
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From the above figures, we can conclude that CO2 emissions do not necessarily always
increase with GDP. Some countries have performed extremely well while maintaining GDP
growth, for example, Singapore, Hong Kong, USA and most of the EU countries.
4 Empirical results
4.1 Carbon taxation effects
We first consider a regression model with year and country fixed effects as in Equation (1).
We start from including only the carbon taxation dummy to the regression. Then we slowly
add more covariates. The regression outputs are reported in Columns (A)-(E) in Table (3).
Three methods are used. The usual one-way cluster by country follows Assumption (1),
i.e., the standard errors are assumed to be heteroscedastic and autocorrelated. The results
are shown in the row of Standard cluster by country. To deal with few clusters problem,
still following Assumption (1), we use the wild bootstrap method following Cameron et al.
[2008, 2012]. The number of bootstrap replicates is 3000 for each regression.16 The results
are reported in the row of CGM. When the standard errors are robust to very general forms
of cross-sectional (‘spatial’) and temporal dependence, i.e., following Assumption (2), we
follow Hoechle [2007] and the results are shown in the row of Hoechle. We find clear
evidence that the implementation of carbon taxation efficiently reduces CO2 emissions in
the 35-year period.
To estimate the effect of implementation of carbon taxation on CO2 emission per capita
per year, we start from a linear regression including only one carbon tax dummy. The
estimation equation is as follows:
CO2it = α · Taxit + θi + δt + εit (3)
where the binary regressor Taxit equals one if carbon taxation is in effect in country i in
year t and equals zero otherwise. We follow Dynarski [2004], Cameron et al. [2008, 2012]
and Hoechle [2007] and compare the regression output. The results are reported in Colomn
(A). Countries using carbon taxation reduce their CO2 emissions by −1.007 Million ton
per year per capita. The 95% confidence intervals are given in the rows. An interval
of -2.166 and 0.153 is obtained with standard cluster by countries. When bootstrapping
3000 replicates, a narrower interval of -2.003 and 0.051 is obtained. In the third row,
the standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and cross-sectional
(spatial) and temporal dependence. The carbon taxation treatment effect becomes highly
16We report the estimates with 500, 1000 and 2000 bootstrap replicates in the section of Robustness
Check.
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Table 3: Estimates for the effect of carbon taxation on CO2 emission per capita
per year
REGRESSIONS
VARIABLES (A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Carbon tax -1.007 -1.105 -0.783 -0.553 -0.605
Energy Intensitya -15.346 -15.829 -15.855 -10.405
GDP on PPP per capita -0.015 -0.072 -0.091 -0.044
ETS -1.678 -1.251
Renewablesb
Share of geothermal, biomass and other -26.696 -19.942 -18.909
Share of solar -60.017 -54.087 -34.599
Share of wind -23.164 -17.097 -9.891
Non-renewables
Share of nuclear -18.036 -17.585 -12.777
Share of hydroelectricity -13.828
Share of coal 6.803
Share of natural gas 2.710
Country fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes
95% confidence intervals for carbon taxation effect
Standard cluster by country (-2.166 - 0.153) (-2.187 - -0.023) (-1.543 - -0.023) (-1.207 - 0.101) (-1.206 - -0.004)
CGM (bootstrap reps 3000c) (-2.003 - 0.051) (-2.033 - -0.135) (-1.595 - 0.029) (-1.191 - 0.084) (-1.145 - -0.065)
Hoechle (-1.518 - -0.495) (-1.723 - -0.488) (-1.122 - -0.444) (-0.991 - -0.218) (-0.882 - -0.225)
Sample size
Number of countries 26 26 26 26 26
Observations 910 910 910 910 910
R-squared 0.896 0.900 0.921 0.929 0.937
a energy intensity = Primary energy consumption per capita / GDP, where primary energy includes both renewables and non-renewables.
b Share of energy consumption = energy consumption / Primary energy consumption.
c We apply a country-specific bootstrap.
sufficient — an interval of -1.518 and -0.495 is obtained.
Renewable and nuclear energies are widely considered to be efficient in CO2 emission
reduction. Therefore we add them in Regression (C) as control covirates. For countries
that use these energies and carbon taxation, an average CO2 reduction of −0.783 is found.
We now slowly add more control covariates as reported in Columns (B)-(E). Although
the results differ depending on the choice of covirates, overall, the interval estimates indicate
significant treatment effect. In Column (E), Emission Trading Scheme dummy, shares of
renewable and non-renewable energy consumption (less oil consumption), GDP on PPP
per capita and Enengy Intensity of GDP are the control covariates. The regression now
becomes:
CO2it = αTaxit + β1EIit + β2GDPonPPPit + β3ETSit + β4ShareGeothermalBiomassit
+ β5ShareSolarit + β6ShareWindit + β7ShareNuclearit + β8ShareCoalit
+ β9ShareHydroelectricityit + β10ShareNaturalGasit + θi + δt + εit (4)
On average, the implementation of carbon taxation reduces CO2 by −0.605 Million ton
per capita per year. Using the standard cluster by country, the confidence interval is
(−1.206−−0.004). The interval changes to (−1.145−−0.065) when we apply the country
specific bootstrap. When correcting for cross-sectional dependence, the confidence interval
of (−0.882−−0.225) is narrower.
16
Next, we examine whether the length of use of carbon taxation has an effect on CO2
emissions. We create new variables for every 5 more years of carbon taxation implementation
as shown in Table (4). In Regression (A), we exclude any control covirates. The estimates
are not statistically significant. The results improves when we control for ETS dummy,
energy intensity and GDP on PPP per capita as shown in Regression (B). We observe a
clear decreasing trend — a CO2 reduction of −0.655 Million ton per capita in the first five
years and −2.382 for a over 20-year taxation implementation. Finally, we add the shares
of renewable and non-renewable energy consumption (less oil consumption) in Regression
(C). The results are highly significant as the robust confidence intervals show. In the first
5-year of using carbon taxation, countries in the treatment group reduce CO2 by −0.632
Million ton per capita. The longer the duration of carbon taxation implementation, the
more CO2 emissions are reduced. For the four countries that have been using carbon
taxation for over 20 years: Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, the CO2 reduction
increased to −1.757 Million ton per capita as reported in the row of tax21to25.
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In the robustness check we test the model with a different selection of control group.
Following Dynarski [2004], we drop the non-carbon tax users which leave us date of 11
countries. These countries are in the control group before carbon taxes are implemented.
Their identities change to the treatments once carbon taxes are introduced. We find that
our main results are not sensitive to the choice of the control group. Therefore, we suggest
a clear evidence on the effectiveness of the implementation of carbon taxation on CO2
emissions reduction.
4.2 The interaction of carbon taxation and ETS
Next, we test the joint effect of carbon taxation and ETS. We try to answer whether the
use of both carbon pricing instruments would reduce CO2. By comparing the regression
outputs we get above, we try to determine whether a combination of both instruments are
a more efficient way to reduce CO2 emissions. The regression is as follows:
CO2it = α(Tax ∗ ETS)it + x′itβ + θi + δt + εit (5)
where the environmental policy of interest becomes the interaction of carbon taxation and
an ETS. (Tax∗ETS)it equals one if country i used both carbon pricing instruments in year
t and equals zero otherwise. Ten countries in the treatment group are Japan, Denmark,
Finland, France, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and Canada.
The results are reported in Table (5). We start from regressing CO2 per year per capita
on the Tax∗ETS dummy only as in Column (A). A yearly reduction of −1.248 Million ton
is found for the countries who use both carbon taxation and ETS. From the 95% confidence
intervals reported in the parentheses, the results are statistically significant. The coefficient
changes to −1.348 when we control for the Energy Intensity and GDP on PPP per capita to
the regression as Column (B) shows. In Regression (C), we add the renewable and nuclear
energies as control covirates. For countries that use these energies and both carbon pricing
instruments, an average CO2 reduction of −1.057 is found. In Column (D), we report
the regression including all shares of renewables and non-renewables consumption. The
implementation of both instruments effectively reduces −0.886 Million ton CO2 per capita
per year. As before, to correct the standard error estimates, three methods are used. At
the 95% confidence level, the results are statistically significant.
Furthermore, we compare the treatment effects of tax-only (Table 3) and a joint use
of both carbon pricing instruments. We find that a joint use performs better: more CO2
emission has been reduced.
Next, we examine whether the length of the use of both instruments has an effect on CO2
reduction. We create new variables for every three additional years of implementation. The
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Table 5: Estimates for the effect of carbon pricing instruments on CO2 emission
per capita per year
REGRESSIONS
VARIABLES (A) (B) (C) (D)
Tax X ETSa -1.248 -1.348 -1.057 -0.886
Energy Intensity -15.363 -15.723 -9.863
GDP on PPP per capita -0.015 -0.072 -0.025
Renewables
Share of geothermal, biomass and other -25.710 -22.508
Share of solar -70.268 -45.387
Share of wind -22.144 -12.341
Non-renewables
Share of nuclear -18.035 -11.817
Share of hydroelectricity -12.920
Share of coal 8.214
Share of natural gas 3.824
Country fixed effect yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes
95% confidence intervals for carbon taxation effect
Standard cluster by country (-2.449 - -0.047) (-2.529 - -0.167) (-1.876 - -0.239) (-1.616 - -0.156)
CGM (bootstrap reps 3000) (-2.431 - -0.065) (-2.585 - -0.111) (-1.933 - -0.182) (-1.683 - -0.089)
Hoechle (-1.713 - -0.783) (-1.871 - -0.825) (-1.517 - -0.597) (-1.271 - -0.502)
Sample size
Number of countries 26 26 26 26
Observations 910 910 910 910
R-squared 0.897 0.901 0.922 0.934
a It is to test the effect of the interaction of ETS and carbon tax on CO2 emission. 1 for the countries who use both ETS and
carbon tax, 0 otherwise.
results are reported in Table (6). We first exclude any control covirates as Regression (A)
shows. The treatment effect is immediate: the yearly emission reduction of −0.572 Million
ton is found in the first three-year period. For a country that has used both instruments
for 10 years, the emission reduction of −2.248 is dramatic. By including Energy Intensity
and GDP on PPP per capita in Regression (B), the results improves sightly. We finally
control for the shares of energy consumption as shown in Regression (C). Starting from an
immediate reduction of −1.078 in the first three-year period, approximately 0.1 Million ton
more CO2 emission reduces for every three more years of implementation. We therefore see
clear evidence of a stable decreasing trend: the longer the duration of the implementation,
the more CO2 emission reduces. From the 95% of confidence interval in parentheses, the
results are highly significant.
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5 Robustness check
5.1 Selection of the control group
We suggest there is little doubt that carbon pricing instruments users have higher incentive
to reduce CO2 emissions and contribute more to a cleaner environment. Therefore they
might have stronger preferences towards the use of nuclear or renewable energy, compared
to the countries that have not implemented either carbon taxation or ETS by 2014. Also
taking account of countries’ different GDP performance and Energy Intensity improvement
as well as some other country specific effects which we do not include in our model (such as
nature resource, cars emission and fuel economy figures), we suspect that the non-carbon
pricing instrument users form a poor control group. We follow Dynarski [2004] and test the
sensitivity of our results to the choice of control group. We drop 15 non-carbon taxation
users from the sample and test the effect of carbon taxation from the staggered timing of
its implementation across countries. The identification of the treatments (in green) and
controls (in red) is illustrated in Figure (4). Finland was the first to introduce carbon tax
in 1990. Thus before 1990, all the 11 countries are the controls. In 1990, Finland moves
into the treatment group, followed by Norway and Sweden in 1991 and then by Denmark
in 1992. France is the last country to join the treatments in our sample. It started to use
carbon tax in 2014. Thus by 2014, all the eleven countries are in the treatment group.
22
F
ig
u
re
4:
T
im
in
g
of
in
tr
od
u
ct
io
n
of
ca
rb
on
ta
xa
ti
on
Tr
ea
tm
en
t
C
on
tr
ol
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
A
us
tr
al
ia
Ja
pa
n
D
en
m
ar
k
F
in
la
nd
Fr
an
ce
Ir
el
an
d
N
or
w
ay
Sw
ed
en
Sw
it
ze
la
nd U
K
C
an
ad
a
23
The regression output is reported in Table (7). Overall, the estimations are not sensitive
to the choice of treatment and control group, although the confidence interval becomes less
significant. We compare the results in Column (D) in Table (3) and Column (A) in Table
(7), the estimation of treatment effect decreases slightly from −0.605 to −0.689. Similarly,
we find the estimations drop by comparing results in Column (C) in Table (4) and Column
(B) in Table (7). A 5-year use of carbon taxation reduces CO2 by −0.845 Million ton
per capita. For every five more year’s use of carbon taxation, we find approximately 0.5
Million per capita less CO2 emission. As these results are similar to the ones we obtained
earlier, it becomes clear that the longer duration of use of carbon taxation, the more CO2
reduces. For countries that have been using carbon taxation for more than 20 years, the
CO2 reduction of −2.927 demonstrates its effectiveness.
Table 7: Estimates for the effect of carbon taxation on CO2 emission per capita
per year, carbon taxation users only
REGRESSIONS
(A) (B)
VARIABLES Std cluster by cty CGM Hoechle Std cluster by cty CGM Hoechle
carbon taxation -0.689* -0.689 -0.689**
(-1.474 - 0.096) (-1.622 - 0.244) (-1.369 - -0.009)
tax1to5 -0.845** -0.845** -0.845***
(-1.483 - -0.208) (-1.624 - -0.067) (-1.293 - -0.398)
tax6to10 -1.086** -1.086* -1.086***
(-2.020 - -0.152) (-2.332 - 0.160) (-1.557 - -0.615)
tax11to15 -1.676** -1.676 -1.676***
(-3.300 - -0.051) (-3.686 - 0.334) (-2.272 - -1.079)
tax16to20 -2.174** -2.174** -2.174***
(-3.913 - -0.435) (-4.144 - -0.204) (-3.087 - -1.261)
tax21to25 -2.927*** -2.927** -2.927***
(-4.947 - -0.907) (-5.403 - -0.450) (-4.195 - -1.658)
ETS yes yes
Energy Intensity yes yes
GDP on PPP per capita yes yes
Shares of energyc yes yes
Country fixed effect yes yes
Year fixed effect yes
Sample size
Number of countries 11 11
Observations 385 385
R-squared 0.967 0.966
a Robust confidence interval in parentheses.
b CGM Bootstrap reps 3000.
c The covariates ‘Shares of energy’ represent the shares of all renewable and non-renewable energy consumption less oil.
Next, we test the sensitivity of our results in the joint effect of both carbon pricing
instruments to the choice of control group. We include ten countries that have used both
carbon taxation and ETS in the 35-year period. From 1980-2004, all countries are controls.
In 2005, the four Nordic countries first move into the treatment group. Switzerland and
Canada follow in 2008. France is the last to join the treatments in 2014.
We first compare Regression (C) in Table (5) with Regression (A) in Table (8). The
estimate of reduction increases slightly from −0.886 to −0.645 million tons per year and
the results are less significant given by the wider confidence intervals. From Regression
(A) in Table (8), we see a similar decreasing trend as shown in Regression (C) in Table
(6). An immediate emission reduction of −0.932 is found in the first three-year period.
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Table 8: Estimates for the effect of carbon pricing instruments on CO2 emission
per capita per year, carbon pricing instruments users only
REGRESSIONS
(A) (B)
VARIABLES Std cluster by cty CGM Hoechle Std cluster by cty CGM Hoechle
Tax X ETS -0.645 -0.645 -0.645***
(-1.442 - 0.152) (-1.610 - 0.320) (-1.077 - -0.214)
taxXets1to3 -0.932** -0.932** -0.932***
(-1.590 - -0.274) (-1.821 - -0.043) (-1.247 - -0.617)
taxXets4to6 -1.443*** -1.443** -1.443***
(-2.372 - -0.514) (-2.718 - -0.168) (-1.910 - -0.976)
taxXets7to9 -1.737*** -1.737** -1.737***
(-2.821 - -0.652) (-3.174 - -0.300) (-2.290 - -1.183)
taxXets10plus -1.923*** -1.923** -1.923***
(-3.193 - -0.652) (-3.513 - -0.332) (-2.619 - -1.226)
Energy Intensity yes yes
GDP on PPP per capita yes yes
Shares of energyc yes yes
Country fixed effect yes yes
Year fixed effect yes
Sample size
Number of countries 10 10
Observations 350 350
R-squared 0.967 0.960
a Robust confidence interval in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
b CGM Bootstrap reps 3000.
c The covariates ‘Shares of energy’ represent the shares of all renewable and non-renewable energy consumption less oil.
This figure doubles for the countries that have used both carbon pricing instruments for
ten years as reported in the row of taxXets10plus. Although the results change, overall,
we find the choice of the treatment and control groups is not very sensitive. We could still
suggest a clear evidence that the implementation of both carbon taxation and ETS has
efficiently reduced CO2 emission over the past 35 years. And it performs slightly better
than a carbon tax-only implementation.
5.2 Selection of bootstrap replicates
Now we examine the results with all 26 countries in our data but less bootstrap replicates.
We show that the above findings hold with different selections of replicates. We first
estimates the effect of carbon taxation on CO2 emission. The estimates with 500, 1000
and 2000 bootstrap replicates are reported in Table (9) Regressions (A), (C) and (E),
respectively. By comparing to the (−1.145 − −0.065) confident interval in Table (3)
Regression (E), the confident intervals are wider with less replicates. However, the results
are statistically significant at 10% level. We then test the length of the use of carbon
taxation. The estimates are reported in Table (9) Regressions (B), (D) and (F). The
results coincide with the our findings in Table (4) Regression (C). In spite of the slightly
wider confident intervals, the results are statistically significant.
Next, we test the joint effect of carbon taxation and ETS with less bootstrap replicates.
The results are reported in Table (10). We compare Regressions (A), (C) and (E) with
the confident interval (−1.683−−0.089) in Table (5) Regression (D). The intervals change
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Table 9: Estimates for the effect of carbon taxation on CO2 emission per capita
per year with 500, 1000 and 2000 bootstrap replicates
REGRESSIONS
reps 500 reps 1000 reps 2000
VARIABLES (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
carbon taxation -0.605* -0.605* -0.605*
(-1.245 - 0.035) (-1.295 - 0.086) (-1.222 - 0.013)
tax1to5 -0.632** -0.632** -0.632**
(-1.145 - -0.118) (-1.172 - -0.091) (-1.112 - -0.151)
tax6to10 -0.746** -0.746** -0.746**
(-1.428 - -0.064) (-1.473 - -0.020) (-1.448 - -0.045)
tax11to15 -1.146* -1.146* -1.146**
(-2.359 - 0.067) (-2.341 - 0.048) (-2.277 - -0.015)
tax16to20 -1.305** -1.305* -1.305**
(-2.599 - -0.012) (-2.633 - 0.022) (-2.538 - -0.072)
tax21to25 -1.757** -1.757** -1.757***
(-3.185 - -0.328) (-3.282 - -0.232) (-3.054 - -0.460)
ETS yes yes yes yes yes yes
Energy Intensity yes yes yes yes yes yes
GDP on PPP p.c. yes yes yes yes yes yes
Shares of energyc yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effect yes yes yes
a Robust confidence interval in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
b For all regressions in table, Sample size: Number of countries: 26. Observations: 910.
c The covariates ‘Shares of energy’ represent the shares of all renewable and non-renewable energy consumption less oil.
slightly with 500, 1000 and 2000 replicates, however, the results are statistically significant
at 5% confidence level. We also compare Regressions (B), (D) and (F) with the results
in Table (6) Regression (C). Note that, with 2000 replicates, the results are statistically
significant at 1%. It provides evidence that the longer the carbon pricing instruments are
used, the more CO2 emission has been reduced.
Table 10: Estimates for the effect of carbon pricing instruments on CO2
emission per capita per year with 500, 1000 and 2000 bootstrap replicates
REGRESSIONS
reps 500 reps 1000 reps 2000
VARIABLES (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
Tax X ETS -0.886** -0.886** -0.886**
(-1.633 - -0.140) (-1.732 - -0.041) (-1.650 - -0.123)
taxXets1to3 -1.078** -1.078** -1.078***
(-1.919 - -0.238) (-1.919 - -0.238) (-1.886 - -0.270)
taxXets4to6 -1.437*** -1.437*** -1.437***
(-2.498 - -0.376) (-2.346 - -0.527) (-2.346 - -0.527)
taxXets7to9 -1.500*** -1.500*** -1.500***
(-2.520 - -0.480) (-2.520 - -0.480) (-2.391 - -0.608)
taxXets10plus -1.545*** -1.545** -1.545***
(-2.596 - -0.494) (-2.750 - -0.341) (-2.667 - -0.423)
ETS yes yes yes yes yes yes
Energy Intensity yes yes yes yes yes yes
GDP on PPP p.c. yes yes yes yes yes yes
Shares of energyc yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effect yes yes yes
a Robust confidence interval in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
b For all regressions in table, Sample size: Number of countries: 26. Observations: 910.
c The covariates ‘Shares of energy’ represent the shares of all renewable and non-renewable energy consumption less oil.
Therefore we show that our main findings hold even with different selections of bootstrap
replicates. With more replicates, better results are obtained.
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6 Conclusion
In this article, we have tested the efficiency of carbon taxation by using evidence across 26 of
the most developed countries for the period 1980-2014. We employ a simple difference-in-difference
model and correct the standard error following Dynarski [2004], Cameron et al. [2008, 2012]
and Hoechle [2007]. The error terms are robust to heteroskedasticity, auto-correlation and
cross-sectional dependence. We confirm that in the past 35 years, carbon taxation has
effectively reduced CO2 emissions per capita in the developed world. The longer the
duration of taxation implementation, the more efficient the reduction of CO2 is found. For
countries that have been using both an ETS and carbon taxation, we find the evidence of
an even more efficient reduction in CO2 emissions.
The findings of this research have clear implementations for countries that made commitments
to cut their CO2 emissions. The use of market-based instruments such as a carbon taxation
or a combination with an ETS is an effective mitigation method. Countries around the
world will need to give serious consideration to adopting these measures.
An area for further research could be that countries’ performance after 2014, especially
after Paris Agreement where most countries, developed and developing, become open to
voluntarily cutting their emissions. Other areas that could be examined include countries
that have been the worst CO2 emitters. We especially wish to provide evidence to these
countries that have not yet adopted market-based mechanisms like carbon taxes to mitigate
emissions.
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A Appendix I. Definitions and measures
The main terms in this articles are listed as follows.
Eenergy Intensity (EI) = Total primary energy consumptionPopulation∗Total GDP
Total primary energy consumption = Total renewable energy consumptionTotal non-renewable energy consumption
Share of each energy consumption = Consumption of each energyTotal primary energy consumption
CO2it: carbon dioxide emissions per capita per year from fossil fuel use and cement production
excluding short-cycle biomass burning (for example, agricultural waste burning) and excluding large-scale
biomass burning (for example, forest fires) (Million ton CO2 per year)
GDP on PPP: gross domestic product based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) valuation of country
GDP (Current international dollar, Billions)
GDP: gross domestic product, current prices (U.S. dollars , Billions)
Coal consumption: commercial solid fuels only, i.e. bituminous coal and anthracite (hard coal), and
lignite and brown (sub-bituminous) coal, and other commercial solid fuels. Excludes coal converted
to liquid or gaseous fuels, but includes coal consumed in transformation processes. (Million tonnes oil
equivalent)
Natural gas consumption: Excludes natural gas converted to liquid fuels but includes derivatives of
coal as well as natural gas consumed in Gas-to-Liquids transformation. (Million tonnes oil equivalent)
Hydroelectricity consumption: Based on gross primary hydroelectric generation and not accounting for
cross-border electricity supply. Converted on the basis of thermal equivalence assuming 38% conversion
efficiency in a modern thermal power station. (Million tonnes oil equivalent)
Consumption of nuclear, solar, wind, and geothermal, biomass and other waste: Based on gross
generation and not accounting for cross-border electricity supply. Converted on the basis of thermal
equivalence assuming 38% conversion efficiency in a modern thermal power station. (Million tonnes oil
equivalent)
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B Appendix II. Test for the choice of covarites
We first regress on share of each energy consumption on carbon taxation dummy, Energy Intensity and
GDP on PPP per capita. The results are shown in Table (A.1). Next, we regress on share of each energy
consumption on the interaction of carbon taxation and ETS, Energy Intensity and GDP on PPP per
capita. The results are shown in Table (A.2).
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